Abstract-Critical infrastructures like power and communication networks are highly interconnected. Hence it is imperative to have an accurate model that captures these interdependencies. A number of models were proposed but each has their own limitations. Some limitations of the existing models were addressed by the Implicative Interdependency Model which uses Boolean Logic to represent these interdependencies. In this paper, we study the Targeted Entity Hardening problem. Some entities in an interdependent network might have a higher priority to be protected from failure. This can be achieved by hardening a set of entities. A hardened entity is assumed to have the capacity to remain operational on being attacked by any kind of adversary. But hardening an entity would usually entail a high cost. So it is essential to minimize the number of hardened entities which would protect all entities in the higher priority set from failure. We study this problem utilizing the Implicative Interdependency Model. We provide a polynomially solvable restricted case and prove that the problem is NP-complete. An Integer Linear program is provided to obtain the optimal solution. A heuristic is proposed whose efficacy is judged by comparing it with the optimal solution using real world data.
Modeling these complex interdependencies and analysis of failure in these infrastructures are considered to be highly important. A number of models have been proposed that capture these interdependencies [3] , [5] , [4] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] . However each of these models have their own shortcomings in bringing out the complex nature of the interdependencies that might exist [11] . Authors in [12] brings out the need to address the complex interdependency which can explained through the following example. Let a x (which can be a generator, substation, transmission line etc.) be a power network entity and b w , b y , b z (which can be a router, end system etc.) a set of communication network entities. Consider the dependency where the entity a x is operational if (i) entities b w and (logical AND) b y are operational, or (logical OR) (ii) entity b z is operational. Models in [3] , [5] , [4] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] fails to capture this kind of interdependency. Owing to the above nature of dependencies, graph based models might lack the capacity to represent the same. Motivated by these findings and limitations of the existing models, the authors in [12] proposed a Boolean logic based dependency mode termed as Implicative Interdependency Model (IIM). For the example stated above the dependency of a x on b w , b y , b z can be represented as a x ← b w b y +b z . This equations representing the dependency of an entity is termed as Interdependency Relation (IDR). Using this model a number of problems were studied on interdependent power and communication infrastructure system [12] , [13] , [14] , and [15] . The Targeted Entity Hardening problem discussed in this article is a restricted version of the Entity Hardening Problem [14] . We use IIM to study this problem with respect to interdependent power and communication network.
An entity x i when hardened is resistant to both initial and induced (failing of entities in the cascading process) failures. In physical world an entity can be hardened with respect to cyber attacks (say) by having strong firewall. Similarly some entities can be hardened by strengthening their physical structures for protection from natural disaster. There exist multiple such ways to harden an entity from different kind of failures. Even though there may be circumstances under which an entity cannot be hardened, in this paper we relax such possibilities and assume that there always exist a way to harden a given entity.
For a positive integer K consider the most vulnerable set of K entities [12] are known. Initial failure of these vulnerable entities would maximize the total number of failed entities (through induced failure) in the interdependent network. The Entity Hardening Problem [14] takes as input an interdependent network, the set of K vulnerable entities and a budget H on the number of entities that can be hardened. With these K vulnerable entities failing initially, the problem finds a set of H entities which when hardened minimizes the cardinality of the final failure set.
For an interdependent power and communication infrastructure certain entities might have higher priority to be protected. There might exist entities whose non-functionality poses higher economic or societal damage as compared to other entities. For example, power and communication network entities corresponding to office buildings running global stock exchanges, transportation sectors like airports etc. presumably are important to have higher protection. Let F denote the failed set of entities (including initial and induced failure) when the K most vulnerable entities fail initially. We define a set P (with P ⊆ F ) of entities which have a higher priority to be protected. P contains all those entities which have a higher priority to be protected. The Targeted Entity Hardening problem finds the minimum set of entities which when hardened would ensure that none of the entities in set P fail. In our initial attempt to solve this problem we consider a restricted class of IDRs. For this setting the problem can be solved optimally in polynomial time and an algorithm solving the same is provided. However the problem is found to be NP-complete for IDRs in general form. Owing to the hardness we provide an Integer Linear program that solves the problem optimally and a non optimal heuristic with polynomial run time. Using power and communication network data of Maricopa County, Arizona we ran experiments to compare the heuristic with the optimal solution.
II. IMPLICATIVE INTERDEPENDENCY MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section we describe the IIM model [12] . An interdependent network is represented as I(A, B, F(A, B)) with A being the set of entities in power network, B representing the set of entities in communication network and the function F(A, B) consisting of the IDRs that capture the dependencies between these two networks. Consider an example where the set A and B consist of entities {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 } and {b 1 , b 2 , b 3 , b 4 } respectively. The function F(A, B) giving the set of dependency equations are provided in Table I . In the given example, an IDR b 3 ← a 2 + a 1 a 3 implies that entity b 3 is operational if entity a 2 or entity a 1 and a 3 are operational. In the IDRs each conjunction term e.g. a 1 a 3 is referred to as minterms. It is also to be noted that the IDRs can have dependencies between entities in the same network. Initial failure of entities in A ∪ B would cause the failure to cascade until a steady state is reached. The event of an entity failing after the initial failure is termed as induced failure. The cascade is assumed to occur in time steps of unit length. Each time step captures the effect of entities killed in all previous time steps. We demonstrate the cascading failure for the interdependent network outlined in Table I through an example. Consider that the entity a 2 and a 3 fail at time step t = 0. Table II represents the cascade of failure in each subsequent time steps. In Table II , for a given entity and time step, 0 represents the entity is operational and 1 non operational. In this example a steady state is reached at time step t = 3 when all entities are non operational. The IIM model also assumes that the dependent entities of all failed entities are killed immediately at the next time step. For example at time step t = 1 entities a 2 , a 3 , b 2 , b 3 and b 4 are non operational. Due to the IDR a 1 ← b 2 entity a 1 is killed immediately at time step t = 2. At t = 3 the entity b 1 is killed due to the IDR b 1 ← a 1 +a 2 thus reaching the steady state. It can be followed that with K = 2, {a 2 , a 3 } represents a set of 2 vulnerable entities. Before describing the problem in IIM setting we note some of the challenges in modeling the IDRs. The main challenge is accurate formulation of the IDRs. Two possible ways of doing this would be (i) careful analysis of the underlying infrastructures as in [10] , (ii) consultation with domain experts. The formulation of IDRs from the interdependent network is an ongoing research and the problem is solved under the assumption that these IDRs can be developed.
With this example we develop the notion implied by the Targeted Entity Hardening (TEH) problem. As mentioned earlier, when an entity x i ∈ A ∪ B is hardened then it is protected from both initial and induced failure. Consider the problem where we have to choose minimum number of entities to harden such that at least the entity {b 4 } is protected from failure. With {a 2 , a 3 } being the two vulnerable entities, hardening entity a 2 (with a 3 failing) would prevent failure of entities a 1 , a 3 , b 1 , b 1 , b 3 . Similarly hardening the entity a 3 (with a 2 failing) would prevent the failure of entity b 4 . Even though hardening a 2 prevent failure of more entities than hardening a 3 , owing to the problem description a 3 has to be hardened which is a solution to the TEH problem in this scenario. It is to be noted that other entities might also be protected from failure when a set of entities are hardened to protect a given set of entities.
The TEH problem is formally stated below accompanied with a descriptive diagram provided in OPTIMIZATION VERSION: Find the minimum set of entities in A ∪ B to harden that would result in protecting all entities in the set P after entities A ∪ B fails at the initial time step.
The TEH problem solutions are based on the following assumptions -(i) A hardened entity is always operational and at any given time step it does not fail, even if the entity belongs to the K most vulnerable set of entities, (ii) the condition k < K is assumed as with k ≥ K hardening the K vulnerable entities would ensure that there are no induced and initial failure, (iii) The set of K vulnerable entities for an interdependent network i.e. the attackers strategy is assumed to be provided. The necessity of this assumption can be described through the example provided in this section. For the interdependent network with IDRs in table I both the set {b 2 , b 4 } and {a 2 , a 3 } represent the 2 vulnerable entities. If we worked with the former set of entities the solution obtained for the TEH problem with P = {b 4 } will be different. Hence for a given K if the attacker has a choice of different set of K vulnerable entities, with the current problem setting it is not possible to find the set of entities to harden. Solving the problem by relaxing the assumption (iii) is considered to be a potential future work.
III. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
In this section we provide (i) a polynomial time algorithm that solves the Targeted Entity Hardening Problem optimally with IDRs restricted to single minterm of size 1 and (ii) prove the problem is NP-complete with IDRs in general form.
A. Solution to the Targeted Entity Problem with IDRs having single minterm of size 1
With two entities x i and y j of network A and B respectively, IDRs of form x i ← y j represents this special case. Additionally an entity can appear at most once on the left side of the IDR. Consider a simple interdependent network with the following two properties -(i) When an entity fails it has the capacity to make one or more entity non operational, (ii) However each entity can be made non operational by failure of at most one entity. Presence of this kind of dependency in the physical word encompass the IDRs of this special case. To develop the solution for this case consider an interdependent network I (A, B, F(A, B) ). Let A ∪ B (with A ⊆ A and B ⊆ B) the K most vulnerable entities of this interdependent network. We first define Protection set in Definition 1. Using the result in Theorem 2 we design an algorithm (Algorithm 1) that solves the problem for this case optimally in polynomial time (proved in Theorem 3). Definition 1. P S(x i |A ∪ B ) denotes a set of entities which would not fail due to induced failure when the entity x i is hardened with entities in A ∪ B failing initially. P S(x i |A ∪ B ) is termed as Protection Set of entity x i .
Theorem 2. For any entity x i and x j with
Proof: Consider a directed graph G = (V, E). The vertex set V consists of a vertex for each entity in A ∪ B. For each IDR of form y ← x there is a directed edge (x, y) ∈ E. In this proof the term vertex and entity is used interchangeably as an entity is essentially a vertex in G. It can be shown that G is either (a) Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) with maximum in-degree of at most 1 or, (b) contain at most one cycle with no incoming edge to any vertex in the cycle and maximum indegree of at most 1, or (c) collection of graphs (a) and/or (b). Consider a vertex x i ∈ V . Let G = (V , E ) be a subgraph of G with V consisting of x i and all the vertices that has a directed path from x i . Moreover The edge set E consists of all edges (x, y) ∈ E with x, y ∈ V except for any edge (y, (A, B, F(A, B) ), set of K vulnerable entities and the set P of entities to be protected from failure. Result: A set of entities H to be hardened. Proof: The Protection Sets of the entities can be found in a similar way as that of computing Kill Sets defined in [12] . Due to lack of space we did not provide the algorithm to compute the Protection Sets. It can be shown that computing these sets for all entities in A∪B can be done in O(n 3 ) where n = |A| + |B|. The while loop in Algorithm 1 iterates for a maximum of n times.
Step 5 can be computed in O(n 2 ) time. The for loop in step 8 iterates for n times. For any given x j and x i , P S(x j |A ∪ B ) = P S(x j |A ∪ B )\P S(x i |A ∪ B ) can be computed in O(n 2 ) time with the worst case being the condition when |P S(x i |A ∪ B )| = |P S(x j |A ∪ B )| = n. As step 9 is nested in a for loop within the while loop this accounts for the most expensive step in the algorithm. The time complexity of this step is O(n 4 ). Thus Algorithm 1 runs polynomially in n with time complexity being O(n 4 ). In Algorithm 1 the while loop iterates till all the entities in P are protected from failure. In step 5 the entity x i with protection set P S(x i |A ∪ B ) having most number of entities belonging to set P is chosen to be hardened. Correspondingly the entity x i is added to the hardening set H. The set P is updated by removing the entities in P S(x i |A ∪ B ). Similarly all the protection sets are updated by removing the entities in P S(x i |A ∪ B ).
We use the result from Theorem 2 to prove the optimality of Algorithm 1. An entity x i is selected to be hardened at any iteration of the while loop has maximum number of entities in P S(x i |A ∪ B ) ∩ P . All entities x j with P S(x j |A ∪ B ) ⊆ P S(x i |A ∪ B ) would have P S(x j |A ∪ B ) ∩ P ⊆ P S(x i |A ∪ B ) ∩ P . Moreover there exist no entity x k for which P S(x i |A ∪B ) ⊂ P S(x k |A ∪B ) otherwise x k would have been hardened instead. Hence there exist no other entity that protect other entities in P including P S(x i |A ∪ B ) ∩ P . So Algorithm 1 selects the minimum number of entities to harden that protects all entities in P .
B. Computation Complexity of Targeted Entity Hardening with IDRs in general case
In general case the IDRs can have arbitrary number of minterms of arbitrary size. With entities x i and y q belonging to network A(B) and B(A) respectively this case can be represented as x i ← p j1=1 qj 1 j2=1 y j2 . The given example has p minterms each of size q j1 . We prove that the TEH problem is NP-complete (in Theorem 4) when the IDRs are logical disjunctions with minterms of size 1. With entities x i and y q belonging to network A(B) and B(A) respectively this case can be represented as x i ← p q=1 y q . The given example has p minterms each of size 1. This class of IDRs is a subset of the general case and hence proves that TEH problem is NPcomplete for the general case as well. In Theorem 5 we prove that the TEH problem is solvable with an approximation bound of O(log(|P |) when IDRs are logical disjunctions of minterms with size 1.
Theorem 4. The TEH problem is NP-complete
Proof: We proof that the Targeted Entity Hardening is NP complete by a reduction from Set Cover problem. An instance of the Set Cover problem consists of (i) a set of elements U = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n }, (ii) a set of subsets S = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m } with S i ⊆ U ∀S i ∈ S, and (iii) a positive integer M . The problem asks the question whether there is a subset S of S with |S | ≤ M such that S k ∈S S k = U . From an instance of the Set Cover problem we create an instance of the Targeted Entity Hardening Problem as follows. For each element x j in U we add an entity a j in set A. Similarly for each subset S i in set S we add an entity b i in set B. For each element x i ∈ U which appears in subsets S m , S n , S p ∈ S (say) we add an IDR a i ← b m + b n + b p . There are no IDRs for entities in set B which prevents any cascading failure. The value of K is set to |S|. This ensures that all entities in set B are killed initially for final failure of maximum number of entities. The maximum number of entities failed in this scenario are all entities in A ∪ B. The set P of entities to be protected is set to U and k is set to M .
Consider there exists a solution to the Set Cover problem. Then there exist a set S of cardinality M such that S k ∈S S k = U . For each subsets S k ∈ S we harden the entity b k ∈ B. So in each IDR of the A type entities there exist a B type entity that is hardened. Hence all A type entities will be protected from failure thus solving the Targeted Entity Hardening problem.
On the other way round consider there is a solution to the Targeted Entity Hardening problem. This ensures either that for each entity a j ∈ A (i) a j itself is hardened, or (ii) at least one entity from set B in a j 's IDR is hardened. For scenario (i) arbitrarily select an entity b p in a j 's IDR and include it in set C. For scenario (ii) include the hardened entities in the IDR of a j into set C. This is done for each entity a j ∈ A. For each entity in set C select the corresponding subset in set S. The union of these set of subsets would result in the set U . Thus solving the set cover problem. Hence the theorem is proved. Proof: We first compute the protection set P S(x i |A ∪B ) for all entities x i ∈ A ∪ B. Each protection set is pruned by removing entities that are not in set P . Now the Targeted Entity Hardening Problem can be directly transformed into Minimum Set Cover problem by setting U = P and S = {P S(x 1 |A ∪ B ), P S(x 2 |A ∪ B ), ..., P S(x | A| + |B||A ∪ B )}. Selecting the corresponding entities of the protection sets that solve the Minimum Set Cover problem would also solve the Targeted Entity Hardening problem. There exists an approximation ratio of order O(log(n)) (where n is the number of elements in set U ) for the Set Cover problem. Hence the same ratio holds for the Targeted Entity Hardening problem with n = |P |. Hence proved.
IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE ENTITY HARDENING PROBLEM
In this section we provide optimal solution to the Targeted Entity Hardening problem using an Integer Linear program and a non optimal heuristic solution with polynomial time complexity.
A. Optimal solution to the Targeted Entity Hardening problem
We propose an Integer Linear Program (ILP) that solves the TEH problem optimally. Let G = [g 1 , g 2 , ..., g n ] and H = [h 1 , h 2 , ..., h m ] be two boolean arrays with g i = 0 (h j = 0) if entity a i ∈ A (b j ∈ B) is in a failed state and g i = 1 (h j = 1) otherwise. Given an integer K let [G, H] be the solution to the K most vulnerable node problem (with g i = 1 (h j = 1) if entity a i (b j ) belongs to the set of vulnerable entities). A set of variables x id and y jd are used in the ILP with x id = 1 (y jd = 1), when entity a i ∈ A (b j ∈ B) is in a failed state at time step d, and 0 otherwise. It is to be noted that the maximum number of cascading steps is upper bounded by |A| + |B| − 1 = m + n − 1. The variables q xi and q yi are used to denote entity hardening. If an entity x i ∈ A (y j ∈ B) is hardened then q xi = 1 (q yj = 1) and 0 otherwise.The objective function can now be formulated as follows:
The set of constraints are described below:
Constraint Set 1: x i0 ≥ g i − q xi and y i0 ≥ h i − q yi . This constraint implies that only if an entity is not hardened and g i (h i ) is 1 then the entity will fail at the initial time step.
Constraint Set 2:
, in order to ensure that for an entity which fails in a particular time step would remain in failed state at all subsequent time steps.
Constraint Set 3:
Modeling the constraints to capture the cascade propagation in IIM is similar to the constraints established in [12] . A brief presentation of this constraint is provided here. Consider an
The following steps are enumerated to depict the cascade propagation:
Step 1: Replace all minterms of size greater than one with a variable. In the example provided we have the transformed minterm as a i ← c 1 +c 2 +b q with c 1 ← b j b p b l and c 2 ← b m b n (c 1 , c 2 ∈ {0, 1}) as the new IDRs.
Step 2: For each variable c k , constraints are added to capture the cascade propagation. Let N be the number of entities in the minterm on which c k is dependent. In the example, for the variable c 1 with . These constraints satisfies that if the entity x i is hardened initially then it is not dead at any time step.
Step 3: Let M be the number of minterms in the transformed IDR as described in Step 1. In the given example with IDR a i ← c 1 + c 2 + b q , constraints of form
These constraints ensures that even if all the minterms of x i has at least one entity in dead state then it will be alive if the entity is hardened initially.
Constraint Set 4:
For all entities x i , y j ∈ P , x i(m+n−1) = 0 and y j(m+n−1) = 0. This ensures that all the entities in set P are protected from failure at the final time step.
With these constraints the objective in (1) minimizes the number of hardened entities that results in protection of all entities in set P . |A ∪ B ) ). This gives a measure of impact on protecting non functional entities when the entity x j is hardened.
B. Heuristic Solution o the Targeted Entity Hardening problem
Using these definitions a heuristic is formulated in Algorithm 2. For each iteration of the while loop in the algorithm, I(A, B, F(A, B) ), set of K vulnerable entities and the set P of entities to be protected from failure. Result: A set of entities H to be hardened. if There exists multiple entities having same value of highest cardinality of the set P S(xi|A ∪ B ) ∩ P then 7 Let xp be an entity having highest CF M HV (xp) among all xp's in the set of entities having highest cardinality of the set P S(xi|A ∪ B ) ∩ P ; Let xi be an entity having highest cardinality of the set P S(xi|A ∪ B ) ∩ P ; the entity having highest cardinality of the set P S(x i |A ∪ B ) ∩ P is hardened. This ensures that at each step the number of entities protected in set P is maximized. In case of a tie, the entity having highest Cumulative Fractional Minterm Hit Value among the set of tied entities is selected. This causes the selection of the entity that has the potential to protect maximum number of entities in subsequent iterations. Thus, the heuristic greedily minimizes the set of entities hardened which would cause protection of all entities in P . The heuristic overestimates the cardinality of H from the optimal solution. Algorithm 2 runs in polynomial time, more specifically the time complexity is O(|P |n(n + m)
2 ) (where n = |A| + |B| and m = Number of minterms in F (A, B) ). It is to be noted if the Algorithm returns H with |H| ≥ K then we harden entities given by the K most vulnerable set. This is because hardening these K vulnerable entities would protect all entities in the interdependent network from failure.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we compared the heuristic solution with the optimal obtained from the Integer Linear program. The simulations were performed with power network data obtained from Platts (www.platts.com) and communication network data obtained from GeoTel (www.geo-tel.com). The power network consists of 70 power plants and 470 transmission lines and communication network constitutes 2, 690 cell towers, 7, 100 fiber-lit buildings and 42, 723. All this data pertains to Maricopa County, Arizona, USA. Five non overlapping regions The function F(A, B) was computed for each interdependent network I(A, B, F(A, B)) using the IDR construction rules defined in [12] . IBM CPLEX optimizer was used to obtain the optimal solutions. The heuristic solutions were obtained using Python. The value of K (K most vulnerable entity) was set to 8 which resulted in failure of 28, 23, 28, 28 and 27 entities over the five regions. For each region an arbitrary set P was constructed using 5, 10, 15, 20 entities from the respective failed set of entities. The set P gives the entities to be protected from failure. The number of entities required to harden for a given region and set P was obtained for the optimal and heuristic solution. The results are provided in Figure 2a -Figure 2e . For the given set of simulations the heuristic solution deviates by a maximum of 50% with the optimal when |P | = 15 for Region 5. This variance can be accounted for the greedy nature of Algorithm 2. On an average the heuristic solution varied by 18.31% from the optimal.
VI. CONCLUSION In this paper we studied the Targeted Entity Hardening problem in multi-layer networks. We modeled the interdependencies shared between the networks using IIM, and formulated the Targeted Entity Hardening problem in this setting. We showed that the problem is solvable in polynomial time for a special case, whereas for IDRs in general form it is NP-complete. We evaluated the efficacy of our heuristic by comparing it with the optimal solution (obtained from an Integer Linear program) using power and communication network data of Maricopa County, Arizona.
